When I posted on this page in 18th March, 2026, that I was waiting for the Bank of Ghana (BoG) to publish its financial statements for 2025, I knew they were doing “smart accounting” to mask inefficiencies and reckless management of the economy.

After reportedly selling about 18 tonnes of Ghana’s gold reserves accumulated under the NPP government, they generated roughly GHS40.3 billion in proceeds, resulting in a net gain of GHS9.57 billion.

If you remember, BoG reported that this was sold to rebalance its reserve portfolio. But the published accounts now raise serious questions about that explanation. There was no obvious macroeconomic need for such rebalancing, especially under a policy framework that had previously been approved to build—not reduce—gold reserves.

The more plausible explanation is now evident in the financial statements. The net gain of GHS9.57 billion from gold sales was reclassified from equity and recognized as realized income in the profit and loss account.  

This is critical.

Therefore, the GHS15.6 billion net loss reported in 2025 must be interpreted in context. If these gold gains had not been recognized in the profit and loss account, the loss would have exceeded GHS25 billion (Could be above GHS40 billion if we unpack the details on gold transactions).

In plain terms: even after selling gold, the Bank still recorded a massive loss. Without it, the situation would have been far worse.

You see this clearly in how the Bank financed its very costly monetary operations. The financial report notes that the Bank’s "strong policy solvency position" in 2025—its ability to cover monetary policy costs with internal income—was specifically "underpinned by a substantial inflow from bullion gold sales".

The cost of sterilization alone reached GHS16.73 billion in 2025.  Without the sale of gold reserves, the Bank’s operating income would have been about GHS12.7 billion—insufficient to even cover the cost of sterilization.

This is the hard reality: gold sales were not just about reserve management—they were critical to cushioning a much larger underlying loss.

Decency is so important, but this administration knows none. It would have been responsible to acknowledge that the gold reserves accumulated under the previous administration provided a buffer at a critical moment—especially after repeatedly labeling that same administration as reckless.

One policy by Dr. Bawumia—the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme—has clearly been a major buffer for the Bank of Ghana. Yet there is an unwillingness to acknowledge this reality.

As I have stated before, the current management of BoG appears to be prioritizing optics over sound balance sheet management. The losses—driven largely by costly monetary interventions—raise serious questions about policy efficiency.

Using gold reserves to offset operational losses does not eliminate the problem—it only masks it. It hides the true cost of policy decisions and delays the necessary correction.

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